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In general, one cannot expect developing countries to have the same environmental standards 
as developed ones. Standards can be at their efficiency levels and yet be lower than in devel-
oped countries due to differences in emissions, in the pollution absorptive capacity and in the 
intensity of environmental preferences. However, developing countries can be said to provide 
a 'pollution haven' if they set environmental standards below their efficiency levels or fail to 
enforce their standards in order to attract foreign investment. This article analyses which 
factors can give rise to pollution havens and examines whether these factors are more likely 
to characterise the developing world. The evidence pertaining to pollution havens is reviewed. 
It is argued that in spite of the rather limited evidence for their existence it is nevertheless 
important to evaluate policy options for tackling (potential) pollution havens. A comprehen-
sive range of options are evaluated according to whether they appear to be effective, politi-
cally realistic, development friendly, closed to abuse and not unnecessarily restrictive. 
 
 
In spite of the popularity of the pollution haven hypothesis, it is rarely defined what ex-
actly is meant by a pollution haven. Public opinion seems to have it that any country with less 
strict environmental standards than one's own country is guilty of providing a pollution haven. 
But such a definition would be misleading as countries cannot, in general, be expected to have 
the same environmental standards all over the world – independently of whether or not they 
want to attract foreign capital. A more sophisticated definition, but inspired by the same kind 
of reasoning, is provided by Eskeland and Harrison (1997, p. 4): ‘The pollution haven hy-
pothesis is, perhaps, best seen as a corollary to the theory of comparative advantage: as pollu-
tion control costs begin to matter for some industries in some countries, other countries should 
gain comparative advantage in those industries, if pollution control costs are lower there (for 
whatever reason).’ Again, in focusing on cost differentials as such and ignoring the reasons 
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for those differentials, this definition does not capture what seems to be the essence of the 
pollution haven hypothesis: that countries set inefficiently low environmental standards or set 
efficient standards, but fail to enforce them, in order to attract foreign capital. 
In this article I will therefore employ the following definition: a country provides a pollu-
tion haven if it sets its environmental standards below the socially efficient level or fails to 
enforce its standards in order to attract foreign investment from higher standards countries or 
countries, which better enforce their standards. In formal economic terms, environmental 
standards are at their socially efficient level, if for each different pollutant the standard is set 
such that the marginal social benefit of an increase in pollution is just equal to the marginal 
social cost of such an increase. Avoiding economic jargon, this broadly translates into the re-
quirement that the pollution levels are in accordance with the preferences of people living in a 
political community (here: country). Hence if environmental standards are inefficiently low, 
then there is excessive pollution relative to people’s preferences. 
There has been much academic debate on the pollution haven phenomenon (see, for ex-
ample, Lucas, Wheeler and Hettige 1992; Birdsall and Wheeler 1993; Thompson and Strohm 
1996; Porter 1999). This article differs from most other papers on two major accounts. First, it 
aspires to provide a more comprehensive analysis of which factors might give rise to pollution 
havens and what systematic empirical evidence tells us on their existence. As we will see, 
pollution havens are an elusive phenomenon in the sense that their existence is difficult to 
demonstrate both theoretically and empirically. Second, and more importantly, it aspires to 
move forward the debate in providing an analysis of policy options for dealing with this elu-
sive phenomenon. What options do policy makers have for dealing with pollution havens and 




Structure and outline of argument 
The next section argues that even if environmental standards were at their efficiency levels 
everywhere, there would still likely to be international differences in those environmental 
standards. This is because of potential differences in the amount of existing emissions, differ-
ences in the pollution absorptive capacity of the environment in different countries as well as 
differences in the intensity of environmental preferences of the people living in a country. 
Apart from differences in the amount of existing pollution, none of these factors would sug-
gest systematically lower environmental standards in developing as opposed to developed 
countries, however. Then a number of factors are examined, which could lead to pollution 
havens as defined above. Of these, by far the most important one is that developing countries 
might suffer from political-institutional deficiencies that could create a bias against environ-
mental preferences such that their environmental standards are set inefficiently low or are non-
enforced. 
These theory oriented considerations are important in the sense that they help to clarify 
analytically when international differences in environmental standards are justified by interna-
tional differences in the efficient level of standards and when they are not. However, the ques-
tion is whether such a distinction is useful for empirical analysis, which after all represents the 
only way of knowing whether and to what extent pollution havens exist in actual reality. Ide-
ally, one would try to assess environmental standards internationally, compare the actually 
existing standards to what would constitute the efficient standards and evaluate whether de-
veloping countries’ standards are further away from their efficiency standards than is the case 
in developed countries. If so, then they would provide a pollution haven relative to developed 
countries. Unfortunately, such an empirical analysis is next to impossible, mainly because it is 
extremely difficult to say what the efficient environmental standards for each country would 
be. Studies analysing the pollution haven phenomenon empirically have therefore invariably 
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taken recourse to testing one of three proxy propositions or hypotheses that would need to 
hold if pollution havens did exist: 
1. Differences in environmental standards affect the allocation of investment flows. 
2. Developing countries’ production and exports have become increasingly pollution-
intensive. 
3. Pollution-intensive industries flee the high-standards countries. 
Reviewing the available empirical literature leads to the conclusion that there is very lim-
ited evidence in favour of either of these three propositions and several reasons are presented 
for why there might be such limited evidence for pollution havens.  
It follows from both theoretical considerations and a review of the empirical evidence that 
pollution havens represent an elusive phenomenon. While their existence is difficult to dem-
onstrate, it would be overhasty to dismiss them completely, however. Maybe insufficient data 
availability prevents our empirical methods from tracing them better. Also, policy makers and 
environmental activists alike seem to be concerned about pollution havens independent of the 
weak empiricial evidence for their actual existence. In times of ‘globalization’ and increasing 
flows of capital to developing countries, this concern is even likely to become stronger. If one 
is concerned about policy, then it is simply not enough to refer to the weak statistical evidence 
for pollution havens found in empirical studies. Rather, one needs to take these concerns seri-
ously and offer policy options to address them. 
This article therefore goes one important step beyond the existing literature. Since the ex-
istence of pollution havens is likely to remain a hotly debated issue, it seems more than perti-
nent to evaluate policy options for tackling potential or actually existing pollution havens. The 
last section of this article therefore examines a wide range of policy options according to a 
number of clearly specified criteria. It argues that assistance for political-institutional capacity 




Theoretical considerations and evidence 
on factors causing pollution havens 
EFFICIENT INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
STANDARDS 
As mentioned in the last section, countries might have different environmental standards, even 
if those standards are set at their efficient level. Environmental standards can differ because of 
at least three reasons: 
 
• Differences in emissions of pollutants. All other things equal, a country with higher emis-
sions should have stricter environmental standards than a country with lower emissions. Un-
fortunately, data on international differences in emissions of pollutants are not directly avail-
able on an aggregate basis. However, one can use differences in energy consumption per cap-
ita as a first proxy to differences in emissions of pollutants.1 According to World Bank (1999, 
table 3.7) low and middle income countries had a commercial energy use per capita of 1,766 
kg of oil equivalent in 1996, whereas high income countries used 5,259 kg of oil equivalent 
per capita. Ceteris paribus, we would therefore, on average, expect developing countries to 
have laxer environmental standards due to lower emissions. 
 
• Differences in pollution absorptive capacity. In principle, different environments can have 
different capacities to absorp or assimilate and therefore to cope with pollution. This much is 
undisputed. Going one step further, it is sometimes tentatively suggested that the environment 
in developing countries might be characterised by higher pollution absorptive capacity (for 
example, Snape 1992, p. 88). However, from a natural science perspective there is no justifi-
7 
cation for such a presumption, as the pollution absorptive capacity depends on the meteoro-
logical and topographical conditions of the local environment and also on the relevant pollut-
ant. 
 
• Differences in the intensity of environmental preferences. It is often presumed that the in-
tensity of environmental preferences is lower in developing countries. Kriström and Riera 
(1996, p. 45) suggest that ‘most economists would argue intuitively that environmental quality 
is a luxury good’. Such a presumption is in conflict with the available evidence, however. In 
Gallup et al. (1993), a cross-national survey encompassing 24 developed as well as developing 
countries, there is no statistically significant correlation between expressed personal concern 
about the environment and real GDP per capita in purchasing power parity in 1992 (GDP data 
taken from UNDP 1995, table 1). There is a correlation, statistically significant at the .01 
level, between support for stronger environmental laws for business and industry as well as 
for citizens. However, it contradicts the common view as individuals in poor countries actu-
ally express stronger support for these laws than individuals in rich countries (Pearson Corre-
lation -.550 for laws for business/industry, -.744 for laws for citizens).2 These findings are not 
confined to the Gallup et al. (1993) survey.3 In the ‘World Values Survey’ (Inglehart, Basanez 
and Moreno 1998), another cross-national environmental survey conducted in 43 developed 
and developing countries, there is no statistically significant correlation between income lev-
els and individuals’ support for environmental protection – as measured in various formula-
tions asking for people’s willingness to accept price or tax or cost increases for the reduction 
of environmental pollution. More systematically, Kriström and Riera (1996) have surveyed 
available evidence from contingent valuation studies – all coming from European countries, 
however. Somewhat to their own surprise they find that individuals in lower income brackets 
express a higher willingness-to-pay as a share of their income than individuals in higher in-
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come brackets. It seems fair to say, therefore, that there is no strong evidence showing that 
environmental preferences of individuals in poor countries are less intense than of individuals 
in rich countries. 
 
INEFFICIENT INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
STANDARDS 
International differences in environmental standards need not be in accordance with differ-
ences in the efficiency of environmental standards, however. There are a number of reasons 
that could cause such standards to inefficiently differ internationally: 
 
• Transboundary pollution. So far, we have assumed that environmental pollution does not 
cross national boundaries. If it does, then incentives to provide a pollution haven exist as 
some of the burden connected to low or badly enforced environmental standards is borne by 
other countries. What evidence do we have on pollution spillover effects? To my knowledge, 
there is no evidence that pollution spillover effects are more prevalent in the developing world 
per se. However, we do have evidence on whether affected countries have found an agreement 
and have tried to internalise the pollution externality. On this account, developing countries 
fare worse than developed countries. According to Sand (1992) de facto participation of de-
veloping countries in international legally binding environmental agreements is in general (but 
not in each and every case) much less than that of developed countries. Similarly, in cross-
country statistical analysis Roberts (1996) found that wealthy countries are much more likely 
to sign and ratify international environmental treaties than poor countries. Ceteris paribus, we 
would therefore expect developing countries’ pollution spillovers to be less internalised via 
international environmental agreement than developed countries’ spillovers. 
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• Bias against environmental preferences. Pollution havens can also arise if a country's stan-
dard setting institution (that is, its government or its national environmental authority) is bi-
ased against environmental preferences. Why might this be the case? First, the agents causing 
and therefore benefiting from environmental pollution might be less in number than the vic-
tims of pollution. There is a whole strand of public choice theory going back to Olson (1965) 
arguing that small groups find it easier to organise themselves and therefore to lobby the po-
litical process than big number groups. Business groups from pollution-intensive industries, 
for example, are usually much better lobbyists with much more money and influence available 
than environmental pressure or consumer groups. However, there is a drawback to this argu-
ment. If the number of pollution beneficiaries is much smaller than the number of pollution 
victims, then at democratic elections the victims have a comparative advantage over the for-
mer group. Presumably, therefore, this first argument is not sufficient in explaining political 
bias against environmental preferences. Of course, many, especially developing, countries do 
not hold democratic elections in the full sense, hence the beneficiaries of pollution need not 
fear to lose out at the ballot box. Freedom House (1999) publishes an annual index of political 
freedom measured on a one-to-seven scale covering the existence and fairness of elections, 
existence of opposition and the possibility to take over power via elections. For a selection of 
the 52 most important developed and developing countries, the 1996-97 index is highly corre-
lated with real 1997 GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (Pearson Correlation .865, 
significant at the .01 level; Spearman’s r .847, significant at the .01 level; GDP figures taken 
from UNDP 1999, table 1): Developed countries tend to have higher political freedoms than 
developing countries. 
Second and connected to the last point, if the political system is characterised by corrup-
tion and is easily amenable to manipulation by powerful and wealthy special interest groups, 
then the beneficiaries of pollution are likely to be more influential than the comparatively less 
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wealthy environmental pressure or consumer groups. ‘Regulatory capture’ becomes easier if 
lobbyists from pollution-intensive industries can bribe officials from environmental agencies. 
Porter (1999) argues forcefully that developing countries are much more likely to suffer from 
this kind of failure of political system than developed ones. Transparency International (1999) 
publishes an index of perceived corruption, defined as the perceived corruption in the public 
sector in terms of abuse of public office for private gain, measured on a zero-to-ten scale. For 
the same 52 developed and developing countries as above, the 1996 index is highly negatively 
correlated with real 1997 GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (Pearson Correlation -
.638, Spearman’s r -.743, both significant at the .01 level; GDP figures taken from UNDP 
1999, table 1): Developing countries tend to be perceived as being more corrupt than devel-
oped countries. 
Third, whereas the benefits of pollution are present, tangible and highly visible in terms of 
the goods and services that are produced and the jobs that are created or secured, the costs of 
pollution are often invisible, intangible, uncertain and occur in the future. Myopic policy mak-
ers whose interests might primarily centre around the prospects of re-election in the near fu-
ture, might therefore tend to focus on the benefits of pollution at the expense of its costs. They 
might be encouraged to do so if because of economic hardship the electorate regards other 
problems than environmental pollution to be the more pressing ones. Maybe surprisingly, 
there is no systematic evidence demonstrating that individuals in developing countries regard 
other problems more pressing relative to environmental problems. In the already mentioned 
Gallup et al. (1993) study the percentage of respondents volunteering to state environmental 
problems as the most important problem facing the nation is not statistically significantly cor-
related with GDP per capita. Similarly, in the World Values Survey (Inglehart, Basanez and 
Moreno 1998) approval rates for the statement ‘If we want to combat unemployment in this 
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country, we shall just have to accept environmental problems’ is not significantly negatively 
correlated with GDP per capita. 
Fourth, bias against environmental preferences can stem from political-institutional failure 
of a country. Even if policy makers are not biased against environmental preferences per se 
and try to satisfy the true preferences of their citizenship, a country, especially a developing 
country, might not have the advanced political, legal, administrative and regulatory capacity to 
provide environmental protection at the efficient level. Political-institutional failure might 
either lead to inefficiently low environmental standards or to non-enforcement of standards. 
Birdsall and Wheeler (1993, p. 138) suggest that ‘the relative costs of monitoring and enforc-
ing pollution standards are higher in developing countries, given scarcity of trained personnel, 
difficulty of acquiring sophisticated equipment, and the high marginal costs of undertaking 
any new governmental activity when the policy focus is on reducing fiscal burdens’. In using a 
multidimensional survey analysis of national environmental reports to the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, Dasgupta 
et al. (1995) find that a country’s overall institutional environmental performance as measured 
by environmental awareness, scope of policies adopted, scope of legislation enacted, control 
mechanisms in place and the degree of success in implementation is positively correlated with 
its income per capita and the development of its legal and regulatory system. 
Fifth, policy makers can be biased against environmental preferences if this allows domes-
tic firms to reap profits from international imperfectly competitive markets. Barrett (1994) 
shows that if firms in these markets compete with each other in quantities (so-called Cournot-
competition), then lowering environmental standards allows domestic firms to expand their 
output and increase their profit share at the expense of foreign firms. This is often called ‘eco-
logical dumping’ and in so far as countries do not tax away all the additional firm profit, for-
eign investors will find it attractive to invest in a low standards countries. However, whether 
12 
‘ecological dumping’ can explain the provision of pollution havens is rather dubious for two 
reasons. First, Barrett (1994) shows as well that if companies compete with each other in 
prices rather than in quantities (so-called Bertrand competition), then governments have an 
incentive to actually raise environmental standards as this will allow domestic firms to raise 
their prices and increase their profit share at the expense of foreign firms. In other words, in-
stead of ‘ecological dumping’ there can as well be ‘ecological over-pricing’ depending on the 
form of competition. Second, even if firms compete in quantities, all countries have an incen-
tive to lower their environmental standards. Hence, all countries will have inefficiently low 
environmental standards, but there is no reason to expect that developing countries provide 
pollution havens relative to developed countries. 
 
• Dependency on capital tax revenue. Oates and Schwab (1988) and Chao and Eden (1997) 
show that countries have an incentive to set environmental standards inefficiently low if their 
government’s tax revenue depends in part on capital taxation. Lowering environmental stan-
dards is a means of attracting foreign capital and keeping domestic capital which raises tax 
revenue. IMF (1998, pp. 4-5) provides evidence on the types of governmental revenue as per-
centages of total revenue in general and on corporate taxation as a proxy to capital taxation in 
particular. While the percentage of total revenue stemming from corporate taxation obviously 
varies a lot from country to country, it is striking that quite a few developing countries derive 
above 15% of their total revenue from corporate taxation, whereas in developed countries the 
dependency ratio is usually below 15%, with the exception of Australia which has a rate of 
almost 17%. Ceteris paribus, we would therefore expect that some developing countries might 
have lower environmental standards. 
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• Jurisdictional market power in the market for capital. Van Long and Siebert (1991) and 
Rauscher (1994) have shown that if countries are ‘large’ so that they can exercise market 
power in the capital market (a possibility we have implicitly excluded so far), then a capital 
exporting country has an incentive to lower its environmental standards in order to restrict its 
capital export and raise its rate of return on its foreign investment. A capital importing country 
with market power has the opposite incentives. This argument can hardly give rise to develop-
ing countries providing pollution havens, however. First, there is hardly a developing country 
large enough to raise or lower the rate of return on capital. If at all, then developing countries 
could merely exercise market power in a concerted joint effort, which is non existent at the 
moment. Second, and more importantly, developing countries are net capital importers so that 
instead of having an incentive to provide pollution havens they would have an incentive to set 
inefficiently strict environmental standards!  
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Table 1 sums up the findings on how we would expect developing countries’ environmental 
standards to be relative to developed countries’ ones under efficiency conditions. Only the 
lower emissions in developing countries would clearly prompt us to expect them to have laxer 
environmental standards. The evidence on the pollution absorptive capacity of the environ-
ment and the intensity of environmental preferences is indeterminate. 
 
< INSERT TABLE 1 HERE > 
 
Table 2 sums up the findings on factors, which could give rise to pollution havens. The higher 
prevalence of pollution spillovers, the more pronounced bias against environmental prefer-
ences and the greater dependency of government revenue on capital taxation are all factors 
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which could give rise to developing countries having inefficiently lax or badly enforced envi-
ronmental standards relative to developed countries. Jurisdictional market power in the capital 
market is a potentially counteracting factor, but its practical relevance is highly questionable. 
 
< INSERT TABLE 2 HERE > 
 
As can be seen from tables 1 and 2, the existence of laxer or badly enforced environmental 
standards in the developing countries might be, but need not represent the provision of a pol-




Systematic empirical evidence 
How to detect pollution havens? Ideally, following from the definition of pollution havens one 
would want to compare existing environmental standards to their efficiency levels. In practice, 
providing a reliable estimate of these efficiency levels would be next to impossible for most 
countries due to lack of reliable data and valuation studies. Invariably therefore empirical 
studies have simply examined whether countries with low environmental standards manage to 
attract capital from high standards countries. If pollution havens exist, then we would expect 
to find such evidence. Note, however, that such evidence is only a necessary, not a sufficient 
condition for proving the existence of pollution havens as the environmental standards in 
countries attracting investment while lower than in other countries need not be inefficiently 
low. 
Practically all relevant empirical studies have examined one of three questions: First, 
whether differences in environmental standards affect the allocation of investment flows; sec-
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ond, whether production and exports in developing countries (the supposed pollution havens) 
are becoming increasingly more pollution-intensive; and third, whether pollution-intensive 
industries leave high standards countries at any significant level. 
 
DO DIFFERENCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS 
AFFECT THE ALLOCATION OF INVESTMENT FLOWS? 
Pollution havens only matter if differences in environmental standards affect the allocation of 
investment flows. While there are not many studies on the international level, there are a few 
more studies examining the effects of environmental regulation on investment flows within a 
nation, mainly in the U.S. Mani, Pargal and Huq (1996) find that differences in the stringency 
of environmental enforcement in different states of India do not have a significant impact on 
the location of new manufacturing plants in 1994. Similarly for the U.S., Bartik (1998) does 
not find any statistically significant effect of variations in the stringency of state environ-
mental standards on the location decisions of new manufacturing plants owned by the Fortune 
500 companies throughout the 1970s. Levinson (1996) examines locational choice encom-
passing all the manufacturing industry. He finds that the investment decisions of only very 
few industries were significantly affected by differences in environmental standards and that 
the effect is rather small. McConnell and Schwab (1990) look at the impact of environmental 
regulation on location decisions for new plants of just one industry, the motor vehicle industry 
during 1973-1982. Their results are ambiguous. Depending on the definition of environmental 
stringency they find either no statistically significant evidence or weak evidence that some 
firms may be deterred at the margin from investing in regions with high environmental com-
pliance costs. 
In contrast to the last three papers, Keller and Levinson (1999) look specifically at FDI in-
flows to the U.S. and examine whether states with low environmental standards attract a 
16 
higher share of this investment inflow than other states. Keller and Levinson find that they do, 
but estimate the effect to be small. Their results stand in marked contrast to List and Co 
(2000) who also look at the effects of environmental regulations on FDI inflows to the U.S. 
Using measures of environmental stringency different from Keller and Levinson (1999), they 
find quite large effects of stringent environmental standards lowering a state’s share of receiv-
ing FDI. 
In moving to the international level, the first thing to note is that the empirical evidence 
from the national level, even if it was unambiguous, need not carry over as nation-states are 
much more diverse in many respects than the states of the U.S. Before looking at two studies, 
which employed systematic statistical analysis, it is interesting to note that environmental 
compliance costs do not figure in the 49 Competitiveness Indicators, published by the World 
Bank (1998b). Neither does it play a role in the competitiveness ranking of 59 countries pro-
vided by the World Economic Forum (1999). In as far as competitiveness is a metaphor for 
the attractiveness to invest in a country, then, in the World Bank’s and World Economic Fo-
rum’s view at least, environmental factors do not seem to play a role. In IMD's (1999) ‘World 
Competitiveness’ rankings the extent to which existing laws to protect the environment hinder 
businesses is one of the criteria, but it is merely one out of 288 and four other criteria reward 
countries for good environmental performance. 
More systematically, Xing and Kolstad (1998) find that countries with low environmental 
standards tend to attract a higher share of U.S. FDI outflows than countries with high stan-
dards. However, they admit that this result might not be robust as their number of observa-
tions is quite low. Eskeland and Harrison (1997) examine how the pattern of foreign invest-
ment in four developing countries (Mexico, Morocco, Cote d’Ivoire and Venezuela) is af-
fected by environmental regulation. They find two things: first, differences in pollution 
abatement costs are insignificant in determining FDI flows to these countries. Second, high-
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polluting sectors do not attract more FDI than cleaner sectors – sometimes even the opposite 
effect is statistically significant. 
 
ARE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS 
BECOMING INCREASINGLY POLLUTION-INTENSIVE? 
If developing countries provide pollution havens, then we would expect that, ceteris paribus, 
their production, and possibly their exports as well, become more pollution-intensive over 
time as dirty industries migrate to these havens. Lucas, Wheeler and Hettige (1992) and Bird-
sall and Wheeler (1993) provide evidence that developing countries had high growth rates of 
pollution intensity of industrial production in the 1970s and 1980s, whereas the pollution in-
tensity has decreased in developed countries. Similarly, Abimanyu (1996) finds that pollution 
intensive sectors have expanded faster than average in some developing countries in East and 
South East Asia. However, it is not clear whether this relative change is due to re-location of 
pollution-intensive industries towards developing countries or represents the environmental 
consequences of the industrialization process (Thompson and Strohm 1996). It is also not 
clear whether, even if this relative change was due to migration of pollution-intensive indus-
tries towards developing countries, re-located industries increased the exports of goods from 
pollution-intensive production to high environmental standards countries. First, Lucas, 
Wheeler and Hettige (1992) and Birdsall and Wheeler (1993) find that closed developing 
countries had much higher growth in pollution intensity of industrial production than export-
oriented countries – a finding, which is disputed by Rock (1996), however, who claims that 
this result is due to statistical misspecification. Second, Mani and Wheeler (1997, p. 20) pro-
vide evidence suggesting that the consumption of pollution intensive goods in the developed 
world has decreased hand in hand with their decreasing pollution-intensity of production so 
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that the ‘consumption/production ratios of dirty-sector products in the developing world have 
remained close to unity’. 
Tobey (1990) analyses directly the effects of differences in environmental standards on 
patterns of world trade finding that developed countries’ stringent standards have not signifi-
cantly affected international trade patterns in the most polluting industries. He uses data from 
the late 1960s and early 1970s – that is, before the major wave of raising environmental stan-
dards in developed countries. But his result is confirmed by a similar analysis by Beers and 
Bergh (1997) for 1992. However, whereas they find no significantly negative impact of the 
stringency of environmental standards on exports of pollution-intensive industries as a whole, 
they do find such an impact with respect to the subset of 'non-resource based' pollution-
intensive industries. 
World Bank (1998a, p. 113) also provides more recent evidence on the pollution-intensity 
of exports from developed and developing countries. It computes the export-import ratio for 
six heavily polluting sectors – iron and steel, nonferrous metals, industrial chemicals, petro-
leum refineries, nonmetallic mineral products and pulp and paper products – for 53 countries. 
The export-import ratio of low-income countries increased by 71 percent to about 0.3 between 
1986 and 1995, that of both lower and higher middle-income countries decreased and the ratio 
of high-income countries increased by 29 percent to 1.32.4 The result for low-income coun-
tries leaves open the possibility that these countries provided pollution havens in the 1980s 
and early 1990s (and possibly before). Notably, however, the lower the income group of coun-
tries the lower as well the export-import ratio. Production of dirty industries still takes place 
predominantly in the richer countries. What is true for income groups holds true on a disag-
gregated level as well: World Bank (1998a, p. 113) finds that with very few exceptions devel-
oped countries export more goods from highly polluting sectors than they import from devel-
oping countries both in 1986 and in 1995. A possible explanation for this rather striking result 
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might be that dirty sectors are about twice as capital intensive than clean sectors, which in turn 
are about 40% more labour intensive (Mani and Wheeler 1997, p. 6) and developed countries 
are more capital abundant and less labour abundant than developing countries. 
For the US only, Kahn (2000) looks at the pollution intensity of exports and imports in 
1972, 1982 and 1992, where pollution intensity is measured according to information pro-
vided by the US Toxic Release Inventory Data. He finds that the growth in pollution-intensive 
imports is mainly due to growth in trade with rich nations, not with developing countries. 
However, he also finds that ‘when poorer nations engage in trade liberalization dirty trade 
with the United States grows faster than clean trade with the United States’ (ibid., pp. 3f.). 
 
DO POLLUTION-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES FLEE 
THE HIGH STANDARDS COUNTRIES? 
Pollution havens, if existent, will attract foreign investment from countries with higher stan-
dards. Do we observe pollution-intensive industries leaving high standard countries? Evidence 
on this aspect exists mainly for the U.S. only. Leonard (1988) in one of the earliest compre-
hensive qualitative studies did not find evidence of pollution-intensive U.S. industries moving 
to Ireland, Spain, Mexico and Romania. More systematic and very strong evidence against the 
hypothesis that pollution-intensive industries migrate towards lower standards countries is 
provided by Albrecht (1998): He looks at the U.S. inflows and outflows of investment from 
clean, medium polluting and dirty industries between 1991 and 1995. He finds that dirty in-
dustries are the only ones for which more investment comes to than leaves the U.S., whereas 
there is a massive net outflow of investment in clean industries. As this result is not due to 
dirty industries growing faster than other U.S. industries, Albrecht (ibid., p. 191) concludes 
that ‘dirty industries are not at all leaving the USA en masse’. 
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The period of Albrecht's analysis is quite small. More importantly, it is for the U.S. only. 
Unfortunately, for the other G7 countries FDI data are not available on a detailed industry 
basis.5 The exception is Germany, for which the following looks at FDI flows of eight pollu-
tion-intensive manufacturing sectors over the period 1989 to 1997 (data taken from Bundes-
bank (1994, 1997, 1999)).6 While the cumulative direct investment of foreigners into Ger-
many in these sectors amounts to approximately 224 billion DM, the cumulative flow of direct 
investment out of Germany amounts to 376 billion DM. It would be wrong, however, to re-
gard this as evidence for a massive flight of pollution-intensive industries out of high envi-
ronmental standards Germany. This is because these industries simply follow the general trend 
of the overall German manufacturing sector, which is characterised by massive net outflows 
of direct investment. Indeed, the share of pollution-intensive FDI among all German manufac-
turing sector FDI has remained relatively close to its average share of about 41% between 
1989 and 1997. That there is a net outflow of investment in pollution-intensive sectors is 
therefore in itself no evidence for this flight being induced by high environmental standards. 
However, the same average share of pollution-intensive among all manufacturing sectors is 
about 39% for FDI into Germany. The difference of two percentage points could be tentatively 
interpreted as evidence for a net outflow of investment in these sectors even after taking into 
account that there is a net outflow of investment of the overall manufacturing sector. It is 
weak evidence at best, however, as this rather small difference of two percentage points might 
be caused by many other factors besides high environmental compliance costs in Germany. 
 
 
In search of explanation: Why is there 
so little evidence for pollution havens? 
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It follows from this overview of empirical studies that the evidence for pollution havens is 
relatively weak at best and inconclusive or even negative at worst. As a next step, one might 
ask why low standard countries do not manage to attract more capital from high standard 
countries. 
The first and perhaps most obvious explanation is that some of the dirtiest industries can-
not migrate as they are dependent on being close to their product market. This explanation 
applies, for example, to electricity generation, but does not apply to the majority of industries 
in the manufacturing sector. 
Second, the costs of environmental compliance might be too low to play a significant role 
in investment decisions. According to OECD (1996, table 1), while pollution abatement ex-
penditures as a percentage of GDP have been slightly increasing between 1985 and 1992, they 
are estimated at well below 2% in most countries in 1992. Potential cost savings of that order 
might very well be too small to induce foreign investors to move to pollution havens for two 
reasons.7 First, because migration itself is costly because of dismantling, transportation and 
new establishment costs. Second, factors other than differences in environmental compliance 
costs are likely to be much more important in determining international investment location 
decisions (Wheeler and Mody 1992). Potential pollution havens might have disadvantages 
with respect to these other factors, for example, they might have a badly trained workforce, a 
poor infrastructure and political as well as economic instability. Doing business carries many 
more risks in developing as opposed to developed countries. Even if industries move to de-
veloping countries, factors such as proximity to natural resources and financial as well as tax 
incentives might play a more important role than potential savings on environmental compli-
ance costs. 
However, there are two caveats to keep in mind: First, how high pollution abatement ex-
penditures are depends on what the point of reference is and varies substantially from sector to 
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sector. If we look at pollution abatement capital expenditures as a percentage of total new 
capital expenditures in 1993 in the U.S., these can be as low as 1.52% for rubber and miscel-
laneous plastics products, but as high as 42.39% for petroleum and coal products and 13.31% 
for chemicals and allied products (U.S. Bureau of Census 1996, table 1). Second, should envi-
ronmental compliance costs in high standards countries rise further in the future, then things 
could dramatically change from what they were before. Markusen, Morey and Olewiler (1995) 
show that in industries with increasing returns to scale, costs can rise up to a certain threshold 
without causing any major re-location. However, because increasing returns industries tend to 
make discrete rather than marginal location decisions, if costs rise beyond this threshold in-
dustries might shut down and transfer their operations to lower standards countries. 
Third, even where environmental compliance costs are significant, international investors 
might not be deterred, as long as the environmental standards provide clear and reliable rules 
that apply equally to everybody. What investors dislike most is uncertainty about the future 
and unreliability of policy makers. 
Fourth and connected to the last point, rational forward looking investors might anticipate 
that environmental standards in currently low standards countries might very well increase 
over time. It might therefore be cheaper to establish already in the present production facilities 
that comply with these potential future higher standards. 
Fifth, if pollution abatement is characterised by scale economies, then increasing environ-
mental standards need not induce migration. Eskeland and Harrison (1997, p. 28) argue that 
‘if abatement costs fall with the scale of output, then the home country firm may find it more 
advantageous to expand locally when facing tougher environmental regulations.’ 
Sixth, if multinational corporations have similar plants in both high standards and low 
standards countries, then it might be cheaper to install the same pollution abatement technol-
ogy as in the high standards countries everywhere. This is because the costs of dismantling the 
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already established technology might outweigh the benefits from saving on abatement costs. 
This will be especially true if the abatement technology is an integral part of the production 
process. If instead the abatement technology is of the add-on end of pipe type, it will be quite 
cheap to get rid of it in order to save on abatement costs. 
Seventh, foreign investors might fear for their international reputation if they are perceived 
as environmental villains exploiting low standards in poor countries. In migrating to these 
poor countries, it might therefore be worth while to voluntarily exceed local environmental 
standards. It is sometimes argued by economists that foreign investors not only tend to apply 
better environmental management than required by the host country, but also tend to demand 
compliance with higher environmental standards from their domestic suppliers. This positive 
effect on the environmental standards of the recipient country has been coined the ‘pollution 
halo’ effect and it stands in stark contrast to the pollution haven hypothesis: Instead of exploit-
ing low environmental standards, foreign investment leads to a rise in environmental stan-
dards. Anecdotal evidence supports this hypothesis (Leonard 1988, Gentry 1999; Zarsky 
1999). More systematic testing provides more ambiguous evidence. Whereas Eskeland and 
Harrison (1997) find that foreign owned plants in Côte d’Ivoire, Mexico and Venezuela are 
more energy efficient than domestically owned plants and therefore as a first approximation 
also less pollution intensive, Dasgupta, Hettige and Wheeler (1997) and Hettige et al. (1996) 
find no evidence that foreign ownership has a significant influence on environmental perform-
ance in Mexico and South and Southeast Asia, respectively. 
Eighth, investors might fear negative effects on their capital market value if information 
about poor environmental performance becomes available. Hamilton (1995) demonstrates 
negative stock market reactions for U.S. companies, which had to report toxics release inven-
tory data to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Dasgupta, Laplante and 
Mamingi (1997) show that negative capital market reactions are not confined to the developed 
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world in examining how firm-specific environmental information affected capital markets in 
Mexico, Chile, Argentina and the Philippines. More generally, Gentry (1999, p. 16) refers to a 
recent review of 70 studies exploring the link between environmental and financial perform-
ance, which found that ‘companies with the environmental practices were rewarded with 
higher stock market returns than their peers, by up to two percentage points. Moreover, posi-
tive environmental performance never translated into negative returns’ (emphasis in original). 
 
 
Evaluating policy options 
In considering theoretical issues concerning pollution havens, we have seen that several fac-
tors can give rise to their existence in developing countries. Of these, bias against environ-
mental preferences is probably the most important one. In examining the empirical evidence, 
we have also seen, however, that there is only weak statistical evidence for their existence. 
Pollution havens therefore represent a rather elusive phenomenon. While environmentalists 
insist on the existence and relevance of the phenomenon, their claim is not convincingly 
backed by available empirical evidence, at least not so far. 
Should analysis stop here? No. I would submit that it is important to take the analysis one 
step further and evaluate policy options for tackling (potential) pollution haven problems. 
Why? First of all, in spite of the relatively weak systematic evidence, pollution havens might 
very well exist. For example, limits to data availability might prevent us from detecting them. 
Besides, we have seen that some empirical studies do lend some support in favour of their 
existence. Second, and more importantly, no matter what systematic empirical evidence tells 
us, as a matter of fact both policy makers and environmentalists are unimpressed and remain 
concerned about the phenomenon. If anything, the ongoing trend towards increased foreign 
investment in developing countries will strengthen those concerns. There exists and is bound 
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to remain a wide gap between those who strongly believe in the pollution haven phenomenon 
and others, amongst them many economists, who believe that pollution havens are either ir-
relevant or simply non-existent. 
Given the limitations of our current empirical knowledge and the strength of concern, it 
seems to me that an evaluation of policy options for dealing with (potential) pollution haven 
problems is indispensable. This section therefore goes one step further than most other papers 
and engages in an analysis of available policy options. I briefly list a fairly comprehensive 
range of policy options available and provide some examples for existing policies. I then in-
troduce five criteria, with which those policy options become evaluated. Three out of these 
criteria – namely that options should be development friendly, closed to abuse and not unnec-
essarily restrictive – are heavily influenced by the fact that the evidence with respect to pollu-
tion havens is rather shaky. This is because they are likely to ensure that policy options are 
chosen that are favourable to developing countries, which should not become punished for 
something that might either not exist or be of little relevance. The inclusion of these criteria 
should also help in reconciling those who strongly disagree with the relevance of the pollution 
haven phenomenon with such an analysis. As we will see below, the policy option that fares 
best on our five criteria – namely assistance for capacity building and local empowerment – is 
also the one to which those who regard pollution havens as irrelevant could subscribe to as it 
would help overcoming many more general problems in environmental policy making in the 
developing world. 
 
POLICY OPTIONS AND CRITERIA OF EVALUATION 
I will examine the following policy options: 
 
• Harmonisation of environmental standards and minimum standards. An existing example 
for this on a regional level are Articles 130r to 130t of the Treaty establishing the European 
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Community (Maastricht Treaty). The reader should note, however, that Art. 130t of the 
Maastricht Treaty allows EU member countries to exceed harmonised standards if such 
‘more stringent protective measures’ are compatible with the treaty. Porter (1999) calls for 
a minimum standards agreement exclusively negotiated and concluded among developing 
countries. 
• Enforcement agreements. An existing example are Art. 3 and 5 of the North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, the environmental side agreement to NAFTA, 
which requires each party to ‘effectively enforce its environmental laws and regulations 
through appropriate governmental action’ (Art. 5:1). 
• Trade and capital restrictions. These encompass direct restrictions such as import bans as 
well as tariffs and quotas and "voluntary" export restraints. The most popular form of these 
restrictions are so-called eco-tariffs, which are imposed on foreign countries with lower 
than domestic environmental standards. Daly (1993, p. 26), for example, demands that 
‘whoever sells in a nation’s market should play by that nation’s rules or pay a tariff suffi-
cient to remove the competitive advantages of lower standards’. Arden-Clarke (1993, p. 
81) from the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) wants ‘environmental leaders’ to be 
able to ‘take trade measures that “level the playing field“ between environmentally sound 
and unsound goods.’ The International Pollution Deterrence Act, unsuccessfully introduced 
into the 102d U.S. Congress as motion S.984 by Senator Boren (D-OK) called for counter-
vailing duties equivalent to the cost that it would take a foreign firm to comply with U.S. 
domestic environmental standards (OTA 1992, p. 92). 
• Ecolabels. Existing examples include the German Blue Angel, the Nordic Swan, the EU 
eco-label award scheme, the Canadian environmental choice programme and the Forest 
Stewardship Council's and Marine Stewardship Council’s ecolabelling scheme. 
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• Non-binding declarations. Existing examples include the OECD Guidelines on Multina-
tional Enterprises, the OECD Statement of Intent on Officially Supported Export Credits 
and the Environment and the International Chamber of Commerce’s Business Charter for 
Sustainable Development. 
• Assistance for political-institutional capacity building and local empowerment. This en-
compasses first assistance aimed at building the capacity to formulate effective environ-
mental policies with a long-term vision and strategy and to implement, monitor and suc-
cessfully manage these policies.8 Existing examples are the World Bank’s assistance for 
National Environmental Action Plans, the Global Environment Facility, and the United Na-
tions Environment Programme (UNEP) and United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment (UNCTAD) joint capacity building task force for assisting developing countries 
in integrating their trade, environment and development policies (UNEP and UNCTAD 
2000). Second, and equally important, is a strengthening of democratic citizenship and po-
litical accountability of policy makers as well as improving access of local communities to 
information about environmental pollution, to political decision making and to the legal 
system. There is ample evidence from developing countries that active and empowered 
citizens can play a significant role in improving local environmental conditions (Pargal and 
Mani 2000; World Bank 2000). 
 
I propose to apply the following set of criteria in assessing these options. They are not meant 
to be hierarchical and of course they could conflict with each other for any given policy op-
tion: 
 
• Effective: A policy option should achieve its objective of improving environmental stan-
dards in low standard countries. 
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• Politically realistic: A policy option should be politically realistic. Otherwise it has no 
chance of being realised. 
• Development friendly: A policy option should be friendly towards the economic develop-
ment prospects of developing countries. Given the huge inequalities between rich and poor 
countries, policies that come about at the expense of developing countries should be dis-
couraged. 
• Closed to abuse: A policy option should not be open to abuse by protectionist factions in 
high standard countries under flimsy environmental pretexts. 
• Not unnecessarily restrictive: A policy option should not restrict international flows of 
capital and trade beyond the necessary extent. It is this author’s conviction that a liberal 
capital and trade regime is desirable, ceteris paribus. 
 
EFFECTIVE 
Harmonisation of international environmental standards would be clearly ineffective. While it 
would raise inefficiently low environmental standards in developing countries it would also 
either raise them to inefficiently high standards or would lower standards in developed coun-
tries below their efficiency level. The simple lesson is that one single standard does not fit 
them all – except perhaps for life threatening toxics, which should be banned everywhere 
(witness the almost concluded negotiations on an international agreement banning persistent 
organic pollutants worldwide). 
Minimum standards fare somewhat better than harmonisation of standards as they do not 
imply a lowering of standards in developed countries below their efficiency level. There re-
mains the danger, however, that minimum standards are set inefficiently high for developing 
countries. This danger is significantly less if minimum standards are set in an agreement exlu-
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sively concluded among developing countries. To be effective, harmonised as well as mini-
mum standards would need to include certain monitoring and enforcement requirements. 
Enforcement agreements address an important point in the pollution haven debate. A 
country which wants to attract foreign capital in setting inefficiently low environmental stan-
dards, might not even set low nominal standards. Instead, it might set standards, which appear 
to be high on paper, with the understanding that they will not be enforced. Without ascribing 
the intention to attract foreign capital, it is often correctly pointed out that the former commu-
nist countries in Eastern Europe often had environmental standards, which looked strict on 
paper, but were as if non-existent in reality (Ahlander 1994). In as far as an enforcement 
agreement could itself be enforced it could lead to an avoidance of this phenomenon. Of 
course, it could have the rather perverse consequence that pollution haven countries then 
lower their standards or at least fail to raise them in the future. 
Trade and capital restrictions are very crude measures to aim for raising environmental 
standards in developing countries, but they could be effective. If pollution havens are threat-
ened with import bans or ‘ecological tariffs’ against the products produced in their location or 
find it hard to attract foreign investment due to capital restrictions, then those countries might 
very well abstain from setting inefficiently low standards or failing to enforce their standards. 
Ecolabels are unlikely to be effective in raising general environmental standards in devel-
oping countries. Past evidence of effectiveness of ecolabels is usually confined to specific 
environmental aspects, such as whether tuna is caught with dolphin-safe nets and whether 
forests and marine fish stocks are managed and harvested sustainably. Otherwise it is most 
doubtful whether the various existent ecolabels had any significant effect so far (OECD 1997). 
Non-binding declarations would be ineffective if not backed up by some backdrop threat. 
It is common experience that these declarations often create no more than hot air. If pollution 
havens exist they do so because of economic interests that do not simply vanish because of 
30 
some non-binding declaration. Mabey and McNally (1999, p. 43) suggest that ‘all OECD gov-
ernments admit’ that the OECD guidelines on multinational enterprises ‘have not greatly in-
fluenced companies’. However, voluntary company codes can become somewhat more effec-
tive if they are linked to mandatory information disclosure rules in their country of origin, as 
proposed by Mabey and McNally (1999). 
Whether assistance for political-institutional capacity building and local empowerment 
would be effective depends on the factors that gave rise to pollution havens in the first in-
stance. If they are due to bias against environmental preferences, then this option could be 
very effective in helping to overcome the political-institutional failures that prevent countries 
from setting efficient standards. 
 
POLITICALLY REALISTIC 
Harmonisation of international environmental standards is utterly unrealistic. There is no po-
litical support for such an option especially amongst the developing countries, but also 
amongst the developed countries (ICTSD 1999; Neumayer 2000). The same is true to a large 
extent for the introduction of minimum standards as well, which would fail due to resistance 
of developing countries. Even for an agreement exclusively concluded among developing 
countries there currently seems to be no significant political momentum. 
An enforcement agreement could be politically easier to realise, even though doubts re-
main whether developing countries would consent. The reason is that they would feel stigma-
tised as countries in need of an international agreement to enforce their own laws and regula-
tions. In this respect, it is pertinent to note that the enforcement clause in NAFTA had to be 
pushed through by the US and Canada against the explicit opposition of the Mexican govern-
ment. It was one of the prices it had to pay to gain access to the North American markets. 
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Trade restrictions and eco-tariffs might find political support in developed countries 
amongst some protectionist factions and environmentalists, but proves to be unrealistic as the 
WTO currently puts very stringent conditions on the imposition of trade restrictions aimed at 
so-called process and production measures (PPMs) outside a country’s jurisdiction (see Neu-
mayer 2001b). A reform of WTO to allow these measures is utterly unrealistic as according to 
Art. X:3 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO it would require a two third majority and 
therefore the consent of developing countries, which are strictly opposed to it (ICTSD 1999).9 
Capital restrictions are not necessarily dependent on developing countries’ consent, as it is a 
rather one sided game: developed countries invest in developing countries, but not to any sig-
nificant extent vice versa. However, it is doubtful whether there is significant support for capi-
tal restrictions in developed countries. The (failed) attempt to conclude a Multilateral Agree-
ment on Investment (MAI) (see Neumayer 1999) and the European Union’s and Japan’s insis-
tence to include liberalisation of the international investment regime in any potential new 
round of WTO trade negotiations shows that developed countries want to de-restrict rather 
than restrict capital flows. Also, capital restrictions could possibly clash with the 500 or so 
bilateral investment agreements between developed and developing countries (UNCTAD 
1998). 
To establish ecolabels relating to the environmental impacts of PPMs could find political 
support in developed countries, but they are generally resisted by the developing world (WTO 
1996). Whether such ecolabels would clash with existing WTO rules has not been tested so 
far. But if ecolabels became more than fringe measures in dealing with international differ-
ences in environmental standards, developing countries would likely start a dispute under 
WTO rules. If the WTO panel and appellate body decided against the general use of ecolabels 
with respect to PPMs, as seems most likely, then their use would be dependent on WTO re-
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form, which would face the same resistance of developing countries as the one referred to 
above concerning trade restrictions. 
Non-binding declarations are politically realistic as they seem to be an easy option. At the 
time of writing, the OECD had just finished revising its Guidelines on Multinational Enter-
prises, with a somewhat strengthened environmental chapter in calling for environmental 
management systems and a precautionary approach towards environmental uncertainty 
(OECD 2000). 
Assistance for political-institutional capacity building and local empowerment is not par-
ticularly realistic as it would cost the developed countries money and their willingness to pro-
vide aid has substantially decreased over the last years (OECD 1999, statistical annex, table 
1). If capacity building was to effectively address inefficiently low environmental standard 
setting in developing countries, then developed countries would need to be much more willing 
to provide help either bilaterally or through inter-governmental institutions like the World 
Bank or WTO. In as far as developing country governments might resist local empowerment, 
developed countries would also need to use their political influence on those governments. 
This influence might be rather limited, however, and developed countries might be unwilling 
to use whatever influence they have. 
 
DEVELOPMENT FRIENDLY 
Whether harmonisation of international environmental standards or international minimum 
standards would be development friendly depends on whether any assistance for developing 
countries to raise their standards was provided. The same holds true for an enforcement 
agreement. This is because often the failure of enforcement is likely to be caused not by a lack 
of will, but by the absence of an adequate political, legal and administrative infrastructure for 
enforcement. If assistance for developing countries was not given, as seems most likely, then 
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these three option would be rather unfriendly to developing countries as they would have to 
shoulder all the burden alone. Trade and capital restrictions are clearly development un-
friendly. They are inspired by a desire to punish developing countries for what is perceived as 
undesirable behaviour on their part. The same applies, but to less extent, to ecolabels as well, 
at least if their imposition is not accompanied by assistance for developing countries to com-
ply with the ecolabelling requirements. Non-binding declarations are relatively neutral with 
respect to development friendliness. Assistance for political-institutional capacity building 
almost by definition excels all other options on this criterion. To overcome the failures that 
gave rise to pollution havens would potentially help developing countries to rid themselves of 
other inefficiencies as well and would thus strengthen their overall developmental capacity. 
 
CLOSED TO ABUSE 
International harmonisation of standards or international minimum standards are not very 
open to abuse as they would need the consent of lower standards countries. The same holds 
true for an international enforcement agreement. Capital and trade restrictions clearly are open 
to abuse by protectionist factions in high standards countries under green disguise, given the 
fundamental uncertainty about whether or not existing environmental standards are efficient 
or not. The severe information difficulties - are standards ineffiicently low and if so by how 
much? are standards not enforced and if so to what extent? - give countries imposing trade or 
capital restrictions substantial scope for abuse. Developing countries rightly fear an unholy 
alliance between ‘baptists’ (environmentalists) and ‘bootleggers’ (protectionists) in the trade 
arena (DeSombre 1995). Ecolabels can represent barriers to market access for developing 
countries and are therefore open to abuse. Many developing countries fear that they do not 
have adequate information and capacity to comply with ecolabels, which mainly affect goods 
such as textiles, leather, footwear, forestry and food products that developing countries have a 
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comparative advantage in producing and exporting (WTO 1996). Non-binding declarations 
can in principle be abused as well, but in general seem to be fairly neutral on this criterion. 
Assistance for political-institutional capacity building and local empowerment clearly is the 
policy option least open to abuse. 
 
NOT UNNECESSARILY RESTRICTIVE 
At first sight, harmonisation of international environmental standards or international mini-
mum standards do not appear to restrict international trade and capital flows. However, if de-
veloping countries’ standards were to rise above their efficient levels, these countries would 
face implicit restrictions towards their exports of goods and services and their import of capi-
tal. An international enforcement agreement would not be restrictive, as it would merely as-
pire to ensure that a country’s laws and regulations have more bite than paper tigers. Trade 
and capital restrictions are by definition restrictive and unnecessarily so in as much as their 
objective can be achieved with other less restrictive measures, for example with assistance for 
political-institutional capacity building and local empowerment or, if effective, with ecolabels 
and non-binding declarations, none of which are very restrictive. 
 
SUMMARY OF EVALUATION 
Table 3 provides a summary of the findings on policy options. While no option fares unambi-
guously better than all other ones, assistance for political-institutional capacity building and 
local empowerment seems to be the best option. It has only two drawbacks: It might not be 
very effective if pollution havens are not due to political-institutional failure but due to other 
factors and it is doubtful whether developed countries are ready to provide such assistance. 
 





Developing countries might set low environmental standards for a number of reasons. Some, 
but by far not all, of these reasons will mean that their standards are not only low, but ineffi-
ciently so. In a world of imperfect information it is hard to detect when this is the case. Given 
that discrimination between efficiently low environmental standards and real pollution havens 
is rather difficult to achieve, the more important it becomes that policy options dealing with 
(potential) pollution havens are development friendly, closed to abuse and not unnecessarily 
restrictive – exactly the criteria on which assistance for political-institutional capacity building 
and local empowerment fares best. 
In concluding this article, it is important to point out that even if the systematic evidence 
for pollution havens is relatively weak, this does not contradict the more anecdotal evidence 
purporting to demonstrate that at times environmental conditions in developing countries can 
be abhorrent and that specific industries might migrate out of high standards countries into 
nearby low standard areas, as for example with the so-called Maquiladora region along the 
U.S.-Mexican border (for a good documentation and referencing see Mabey and McNally 
1999 and OTA 1992, appendix E). Especially in the mining and other resource extraction sec-
tor multinational corporations also at times do take advantage of low environmental standards 
in the host country – an impact on the environment, which is outside the pollution haven hy-
pothesis proper and has not been covered by this article. 
Furthermore, an important limitation of the analysis above is that I have looked at whether 
and under what conditions developing countries have incentives to set inefficiently low envi-
ronmental standards. I have not analysed whether international capital mobility might deter all 
countries from setting higher environmental standards for fear of losing capital to one's com-
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petitors. This hypothesised phenomenon is sometimes called 'regulatory chill' (see Neumayer 
2001c). More generally, while examining whether developing countries provide pollution ha-
vens relative to developed countries, I have not examined whether all countries set low envi-
ronmental standards compared to their respective efficiency levels. Such an analysis would be 
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Table 1: Developing countries’ environmental standards relative to developed countries’ 




Pollution-absorptive capacity indeterminate 




Table 2: Developing countries’ environmental standards relative to developed countries’ 
standards under non-efficiency conditions 
 
Factor Evidence 
Pollution spillovers laxer 
Bias against environmental preferences laxer 
Dependency on revenue from capital taxation laxer 
Jurisdictional market power stricter 
 

Table 3: Evaluation of policy options 
 CRITERIA OF EVALUATION 










-- -- - + - 
Minimum standards +/- -- - + +/- 
Enforcement agree-
ment 
+ - - + ++ 
Trade and capital 
sanctions 
++ -- -- -- -- 
Ecolabels - +/- - - + 
Non-binding 
declarations 
- ++ +/- +/- + 
Assistance for 
capacity building and 
local empowerment 
+ - ++ ++ ++ 
 
Legend: ++ very good, + good, +/- neutral, – poor, -- very poor 
ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1
 Eskeland and Harrison (1997) provide statistical evidence from U.S. data that energy use is 
highly correlated with different measures of emissions. 
2
 Spearman’s r is –.506, significant at the .05 level and –.689, significant at the .01 level, respec-
tively. 
3
 See also Neumayer (2001a). 
4
 The World Bank does not control for differentials in export-import ratios in overall goods and 
services, which, strictly speaking, it should do. As this ratio is 0.9 for low income and 1.03 for high in-
come countries in 1995 (data taken from World Bank 1997), the World Bank’s (1998a, p. 113) conclu-
sions remain valid, however: Even after taking into account differences in the overall export-import ratio, 
low income countries import many more goods from dirty industries than they export. 
5
 This conclusion is based on an analysis of the sources provided in the technical notes to OECD 
(1998a). 
6
 These cover the chemical industry, petroleum refining without extraction, production of synthet-
ics and rubber wares, iron- and metal mining as well as founding, paper and pulp production as well as 
processing. 
7
 As these figures include public environmental expenditures as well, which do not directly repre-
sent costs to the private sector, they tend to overestimate the true cost of compliance with environmental 
standards for the private sector. 
8
 Research by Laplante and Rilstone (1995) shows that both inspections and the threat of inspec-
tions are important determinants in enhancing compliance of firms with environmental regulations. 
9
 The amendment would only be binding on the parties accepting it. 
